Introduction
This paper contributes to the foundations of a theory of rational choice for arti cial agents in dynamic environments. As usually formulated in the economic and philosophical literature 11, 23] , the theory of rational choice assumes that an agent evaluates alternative actions by reference to a probability distribution over their possible outcomes together wit,h a utility function de ned on those outcomes, which are both taken as part of the background setting and assumed to be immediately apparent to the agent. In the simplest case, the agent combines probability and utility into a notion of expected utility de ned over actions, and then chooses some action whose expected utility is maximal. The theory developed here di ers in two important ways from this standard approach.
First, while the standard theory of rational choice takes the utility of an outcome as part of the background setting, we note that the overall desirability of an option presented to an agent is often not immediately apparent; and we are explicitly concerned with the mechanism through which it might be discovered by the agent. We focus, in particular, on the case in which the option presented to an agent has a known bene t, but requires some e ort|the execution of a plan|for its achievement. In order to evaluate the overall desirability of the option, the agent thus has to arrive at an assessment of the cost involved in achieving it.
Second, we insist that the task of evaluating an option should be computationally realizable; and in particular, our work here is developed within a theoretical framework rst articulated in 3], and then further elaborated in 4, 19] , that models resource-bounded agents as operating always against the background of some current set of intentions, or plans, which helps to frame their subsequent reasoning. In contrast to the standard theory of rational choice, where actions are evaluated in isolation, we therefore develop a model in which the options presented to an agent are evaluated against a background context provided by the agent's current plans|commitments to future activities, which, at any given point, may themselves be only partially speci ed. The interactions between the new option and the background context can complicate the task of evaluating the option, rendering it either more or less desirable in context than it would have been in isolation.
As an example, suppose an agent is already committed to going to the airport tomorrow afternoon to catch a plane, but has not yet decided whether to get there by taxi or by taking the airport shuttle van. Given this background context, the agent might then have to evaluate the newly presented option of attending a lunch time meeting tomorrow. If the meeting is to be held on campus, and is likely to run late, a decision to attend may rule out the possibility of taking the van. Assuming that the van costs less than the taxi, the new option would then be less desirable in context than it would have been in isolation; the bene t of attending the meeting must be at least great enough to compensate for the di erence in cost between taxi and van to make the new option worthwhile. On the other hand, suppose the meeting is to be held at an airport hotel. In this case, the background context reduces the cost associated with the new option, increasing its overall desirability, since the agent is already committed to going to the airport: the agent might rationally choose to attend the meeting in this context, since it is going to the airport anyway, even if this option is not one that the agent would have decided to pursue in isolation.
Although this situation might appear to be trivial, there are two reasons for trying to understand the reasoning processes involved. The rst is as an exercise in cognitive science: the ability to manage one's activities in a dynamic environment|which crucially involves the evaluation of new options|is an important component of human cognitive capacity, and thus worth exploring as part of the e ort to understand the human mind. The second is as a prerequisite to designing better computational tools. It is generally agreed that intelligent autonomous agents would be extremely useful in applications ranging from military to industrial to educational. But for many of these applications, autonomous agents would need to be able to perform the kind of option evaluation illustrated by our example.
The work presented here begins the task of providing a theoretical and computational analysis of the reasoning involved in these situations, where a new option must be evaluated within the context of a background plan, or set of plans, to which the agent is already committed. While we make no commitments as to how such plans are generated, we do restrict our attention in the present paper to plans that are primitive (not hierarchical) and complete, and in which all actions have deterministic outcomes. In this simple setting, the only ways in which one plan can in uence the cost of another is by allowing or blocking the possibility that separate steps might be merged into one. (In the airport story, for instance, when the meeting is held at the airport, the step of getting to the meeting can be merged with the step of getting to the airport, which is already part of the agent's background plan.)
Although our restriction to this special case prevents us from considering many of the more interesting ways in which plans might interact, even this very simple setting is su ciently rich to allow us to illustrate the shape of our theory, and we defer a detailed treatment of more complicated plan interactions to subsequent work.
Basic concepts
We represent primitive plans using a standard formalism 15, 18, 27] , in which a plan consist of a set of steps, temporal constraints on those steps, and causal links, which record dependency relations among steps. As usual, we assume a set of action types, each with associated preconditions and e ects; for clarity, we limit our attention only to propositional preconditions and e ects. The plan steps are instances of the action types. Much of the planning literature tends to concentrate on qualitative temporal constraints, which specify only the relative order of steps (but see 1, 7] for some notable exceptions). In our approach, we allow also for quantitative temporal constraints, which associate steps with actual time points. To this end, we model time as a totally ordered set of moments fm 0 ; m 1 ; : : :g, with m i < m j just in case i < j, and we assume here that each plan step occupies a single moment of time.
De nition 1 (Primitive plan) A primitive plan P is a triple of the form hS; O; Li, with these components de ned as follows: S is a set of steps of the form S i , each associated with a time indicator t i ; O is a set of ordering constraints, of the form t i = t j , t i < t j , t i = m k , or t i < m k , where t i and t j are time indicators associated with steps belonging to S and m k is a moment; L is a set of causal links of the form hS i ; Q; S j i, where Q is an e ect of the step S i and a precondition of the step S j .
We assume a function Type associating each step S i with Type(S i ), its action type. We require O to contain a temporal constraint of the form t i < t j whenever there is a link hS i ; Q; S j i in L. And we suppose that an entailment relation`is de ned on the temporal constraint language, allowing us to draw out implicit consequences (for example, ft j = m; t i < t j g`t i < m), and providing us, also, with a notion of consistency for a set of temporal constraints.
To illustrate, let us consider the plan, depicted in Figure 1 , of buying a shirt at the mall precisely at the moment m 6 . In the current framework, this plan would be represented as P 1 = hS 1 ; O 1 ; L 1 i, where S 1 = fS 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; S 4 g, O 1 = ft 1 < t 3 ; t 2 < t 3 ; t 3 < t 4 ; t 3 = m 6 g, and L 1 = fhS 1 ; At(mall); S 3 i; hS 2 ; Have(money); S 3 i; hS 3 ; Have(shirt); S 4 ig. The types, e ects, and preconditions of the various steps from S 1 are as depicted. Thus, S 1 represents an action of going to the mall, with the proposition At(mall) as its e ect; S 2 is the action of getting money (which we suppose can be performed either before going to the mall, or at the mall, using an cash machine), with Have(money) as its e ect. 1 one that is orthogonal to the problem explored here; we believe our theory could integrate many alternative models of resources that might be independently developed. 2 Most standard plan representations also include an \initial state," specifying the propositions that are true or false at the beginning of the plan. Since our research falls within the broad area of dynamic planning, where propositions can become true at various points in time, we omit the notion of a single initial state as unrealistic. In general, of course, plan steps must be linked to the truth of their preconditions in a dynamic plan, but rather than spelling this matter out in detail, we make due with the following assumption governing the plans displayed here: the preconditions of those steps in a plan that have no establishing actions are true at the time the steps are performed. Note that this allows a more exible representation than the standard treatment, since not all \initial conditions" must be true at once, and indeed, some may not even become true until after execution of the plan has begun.
We will say that a plan is scheduled when each of its steps has been assigned a speci c moment of execution. In this paper, we adopt the simplifying assumption that di erent actions cannot be performed at the same time. We thus prohibit schedules with concurrent actions, although, importantly, two steps of the same action type can be merged|assigned to the same moment of execution.
De nition 2 (Schedule, scheduled and schedulable plans) A schedule for a plan P = hS; O; Li is a set of constraints O such that: (1) there is a constraint of the form t i = m in O for each S i in S; (2) O O is consistent; and (3) Type(S i ) = Type(S j ) whenever O O`t i = t j . The plan P is said to be scheduled whenever there exists a set of constraints O O such that O is a schedule for the plan; P is said to be schedulable whenever there exists a schedule for it.
As an example, the constraint set O = ft 1 = m 3 ; t 2 = m 4 ; t 3 = m 6 ; t 4 = m 7 g is a schedule for the plan P 1 for getting a shirt at the mall, showing that this plan is schedulable. Of course, a plan whose ordering constraints are themselves inconsistent cannot be scheduled, but even a plan whose ordering constraints are consistent may nevertheless fail to be schedulable, since its only consistent linearizations may be those in which type distinct steps are assigned to the same moment. Schedulability is thus a stronger requirement than mere consistency of temporal constraints.
We focus in this paper on plans that are complete, in the sense that no further planning is needed in order to guarantee the preconditions of their various steps, although additional scheduling may still be required.
De nition 3 (Complete plans) Let P = hS; O; Li be a plan. A precondition A of a step S i from S is established whenever there is some link hS j ; A; S i i in L. A link hS j ; A; S i i from L is threatened whenever there is both an action S k in S with e ect :A and a schedule O for P such that O O`t j < t k < t i . The plan P is complete just in case each precondition of each step from S is established and no link from L is threatened.
This de nition of plan completeness is equivalent to the standard notion from the literature, except that it replaces the idea of temporal consistency with the stronger notion of schedulability.
In order to assess the desirability of a new option against a background context, we need to be able to reason about the plans that are formed when two others are combined, as follows.
De nition 4 (Union of plans) Given plans P = hS; O; Li and P 0 = hS 0 ; O 0 ; L 0 i, the union of the two plans is P P 0 = hS S 0 ; O O 0 ; L L 0 i.
Note that the union of two independently schedulable plans might not be schedulable, since their temporal constraint sets may not even be jointly consistent; also, the union of two complete plans might not be complete, since steps in one may threaten links in the other. If the union of two complete plans can be made complete and schedulable simply through the addition of ordering constraints, we say that the plans are strongly compatible.
De nition 5 (Strong compatibility) Let P = hS; O; Li and P 0 = hS 0 ; O 0 ; L 0 i be complete plans. Then P and P 0 are strongly compatible just in case there is a temporal constraint set O 00 such that hS S 0 ; O O 0 O 00 ; L L 0 i is complete and schedulable.
As an example, consider the plan of going home, depicted in Figure 2 , and represented as P 2 = hS 2 ; O 2 ; L 2 i, where S 2 = fS 5 ; S 6 g, O 2 = ft 5 < t 6 g, and L 2 = fhS 5 ; At(home); S 6 ig; the step S 5 , representing the action of going home, has both At(home) and, of course, :At(mall) as e ects. Here, it is clear that P 1 P 2 , though schedulable, is not complete, since the action S 5 from P 2 of going home threatens the link hS 2 ; At(mall); S 3 i from P 1 . Still, it is easy to see that the two plans P 1 and P 2 are strongly compatible. This is shown by the constraint The notion of strong compatibility de ned here is, in fact, a very strong notion, but it is not the strongest available. A stronger notion is that of perfect compatibility, where two complete plans P and P 0 are de ned as perfectly compatible just in case their union P P 0 is itself complete and schedulable. As we have seen, the example plans P 1 and P 2 , though strongly compatible, are not perfectly compatible. Another compatibility notion|perhaps more realistic and useful in the long run|is that of weak compatibility, which classi es two plans as compatible whenever their union can be made complete and schedulable through the addition, not only of additional constraints, but also, perhaps, of additional steps and links; formally, then, the plans P = hS; O; Li and P 0 = hS 0 ; O 0 ; L 0 i can be de ned as weakly compatible whenever there are sets S 00 , O 00 , and L 00 such that hS S 0 S 00 ; O O 0 O 00 ; L L 0 L 00 i is complete and schedulable. As an example, imagine an agent's plan to arrive at its o ce at 10:00 a.m. in order to meet with a colleague there at 1:00 p.m., where arriving at the o ce establishes the e ect In(o ce) that is necessary as a precondition for the latter action.
This plan would not be strongly compatible with the plan to get lunch at a restaurant at noon, since departing for the restaurant would interrupt the link through which arriving at the o ce establishes the precondition for the later action of meeting the colleague. But the two plans are weakly compatible, since this precondition could be reestablished, and completeness guaranteed, by supplementing the union of these plans also with a further action of returning to the o ce after lunch, along with appropriate temporal constraints and causal links.
Each of the three compatibility notions considered here|perfect, strong, and weak| focuses only on ways in which plans might be supplemented in order to guarantee completeness and schedulability. Other compatibility notions might involve actually modifying, not just supplementing, one of the two plans: perhaps joint execution would be possible if certain inessential steps were replaced by others. In fact, there are a variety of notions of plan compatibility that might be worth exploring. Nevertheless, we limit our attention in the present paper to the notion of strong compatibility, which we take as a reasonable starting point.
Turning now to the semantics of our representation language, we take complete and scheduled plans to be the points in the semantic space, and we associate more abstract plans with sets of these. We begin by adapting the notion of re nement 12] from the plan generation literature.
De nition 6 (Re nement; v ) Let P = hS; O; Li and P 0 = hS 0 ; O 0 ; L 0 i be plans. Then P 0 is a re nement of P (P v P 0 ) just in case S S 0 and O O 0 and L L 0 .
Letting represent the set of all complete and scheduled plans, we de ne the semantic interpretation of a plan as follows.
De nition 7 (Interpretation; v P]) The interpretation of a plan P is the set of its complete and scheduled re nements: v P] = fP 0 : P v P 0 g \ :
The idea, of course, is that a plan is to be interpreted as the set of ways in which it might be carried out, and so it is natural to de ne a plan as consistent whenever there is some way in which it can be carried out.
De nition 8 (Plan consistency) A plan P is consistent just in case v P] 6 = ;.
Note that a complete plan is consistent just in case it is schedulable, and that an incomplete plan is consistent just in case it has a complete and schedulable re nement.
P is found to be compatible with C, the agent should accept the new option just in case the bene t of this option outweighs its cost in the current context. 4 Again, we simplify by supposing that the bene t of the option P|represented here as (P)|is independent of context. In the most natural case, this bene t will derive from the goal state towards which the plan is directed. All that remains to be speci ed, then, is the cost of the new option P in the context C.
Note that the current policy of simply rejecting incompatible options is a highly simpli ed implementation of the general idea of using background contexts to lter new options. More realistically, an agent faced with an incompatible option P could explore either local revisions to the plan that might guarantee compatibility, or else alternative plans for achieving the goal that P aims at; and if the goal is valuable, the agent might also consider modi cations of its background context. The presumption, however, will always be in favor of maintaining plans to which the agent has already committed|that is, of minimizing modi cations to the background context. The full development of this idea would require a theory of localizing plan con ict and performing localized plan repair. This is a challenging problem, which we intend to address in future research.
Cost in isolation
We begin by de ning the cost of a plan in isolation. We take as given a function Cost mapping action types into real numbers representing their costs; this function extends to the steps of a plan in the natural way: Cost(S i ) = Cost(Type(S i )).
Next, we introduce an auxiliary notion of point cost, de ned only for complete, scheduled plans|the points in the semantic space. Where P = hS; O; Li is such a plan, we partition the plan steps into sets of actions forced (by the temporal constraints) to occur at the same moment. For each S i 2 S, we take S i ] = fS j : O`t i = t j g. We then let P represent the partition of S induced by this equivalence relation: P = f S i ] : S i 2 Sg. It follows from our de nition of a schedule that steps in the same equivalence class will necessarily represent actions of the same type; these type-identical steps performed at the same moment are to be thought of as collapsing into a single merged step. We therefore de ne the point cost of the plan itself as the sum of the costs assigned to the merged steps it contains:
Given this auxiliary notion, it is now natural to de ne the cost of an arbitrary consistent plan as the point cost of the least expensive way in which it might be carried out, the least expensive point in its semantic interpretation.
De nition 9 (Cost of a plan; (P)) Where P is a consistent plan, the cost of P is the point cost of its least expensive complete and scheduled re nement: (P) = minfPoint-cost (P 0 ) :
It is easy to see that (P) = Point-cost (P) whenever P is itself a complete and scheduled plan, and that (P ; ) = 0 for the null plan P ; = h;; ;; ;i.
Cost in context
Having de ned the cost of a plan in isolation, we now turn to our central task of de ning the cost of a new option P in the context of a background plan C. Our treatment of this concept is simple: we take the cost of the new option in context to be its marginal cost|the cost of carrying out P along with C, less the cost of carrying out C alone.
De nition 10 (Cost of a plan in a context; (P=C)) Where the plans C and P are strongly compatible, the cost of P in the context C is (P=C) = (P C) ? (C):
It follows immediately from this de nition that the cost of a plan in the null context is identical to its cost in isolation: (P=P ; ) = (P). It is also worth noting that the cost of a plan in any context that already includes that plan as a component is zero: (P=P C) = 0.
This de nition can be illustrated with a case in which the cost of a new option is actually a ected by the background context. Suppose the agent's background context is simply the plan to buy a shirt at the mall, represented by P 1 from Figure 1, and imagine that the agent is presented with the new option of going to the mall for some swim goggles, depicted as P 3 in Figure 3 . Formally, we have P 3 = hS 3 ; O 3 ; L 3 i, where S 3 = fS 7 ; S 8 ; S 9 ; S 10 g, O 3 = ft 7 < t 9 ; t 8 < t 9 ; t 9 < t 10 g, and L 3 = fhS 7 ; At(mall); S 9 i; hS 8 ; Have(money); S 9 i; hS 9 ; Have(goggles); S 10 ig. Here, the steps S 7 and S 8 again represent actions of going to the mall and getting money, steps sharing the respective types of S 1 and S 2 from the background plan P 1 ; the step S 9 represents the action of purchasing the goggles, and S 10 is again a dummy step representing goal achievement.
Let us suppose that these various steps carry the following costs: each of S 2 , S 3 , S 8 , and S 9 carries a cost of 1, since both getting money and making a purchase are easy to do; each of S 1 and S 7 carries a cost of 10, since any trip to the mall is abhorrent; and S 4 and S 10 , as dummy steps, both carry a cost of 0.
Given this information, it is clear that (P 1 ) = 12|the cost of the agent's background plan is 12. Now, turning to the new option, suppose that the agent would like to have swim goggles, but that it is not terribly important: (P 3 ) = 2. It is clear also that (P 3 ) = 12, so that, considered in isolation, this new option would not be worth pursuing ( (P 3 ) < (P 3 )).
On the other hand, it is easy to see that (P 3 P 1 ) = 13, since the least expensive execution of the joint plan, in which both the steps S 1 and S 7 as well as the steps S 2 and S 8 are merged, Figure 4 . Therefore, we have (P 3 =P 1 ) = (P 3 P 1 ) ? (P 1 ) = 1.
Even though the new option would not have been worth pursuing in isolation, it is worth pursuing in context, since its bene t is greater than its cost in context.
As this example shows, the cost of a plan in context may be less than its cost in isolation, but it is also possible for the cost in context to be greater. Our earlier taxi/van story already illustrates this possibility, but it is worth noting that it also arises even in the more restricted framework of complete, primitive plans. In this setting, a plan in context will have a higher cost than it has in isolation if the background plan contains steps that might be merged if it were performed in isolation, but the new option blocks that merge possibility. For instance, suppose the agent already intends to purchase a shirt at the mall, and intends also to buy a suitcase at the luggage store, also located in the mall. Although the agent would prefer to take care of both tasks on the same trip, it is not yet committed to this. (Suppose that each task is worthwhile even if done separately.) Now suppose that the agent is considering an option of seeing a movie at the mall theater. Given its other commitments and the constraints of the store hours, the agent will not be able to combine all three events|the shirt purchase, the suitcase purchase, and the movie|into a single trip. If the movie is combined with the shirt purchase, for example, the agent will need to make another trip to the mall to purchase X X X X X X X X X X X X z :
Have ( 
Cost estimates
Although the notion of cost as the least expensive method of execution is de ned for any consistent plan, we do not necessarily assume that the agent knows the true cost either of its background plan or of any new options under consideration. Instead, the agent may only compute an estimate of the cost of its plans.
De nition 11 (Cost estimate for a plan) Where P is a consistent plan, a cost estimate for P is an interval of the form = ? ; + ], where ? and + are nonnegative real numbers such that ? (P) + . We now show that, under certain coherence conditions, a cost estimate for a plan in context can be derived from a cost estimate for the context together with a cost estimate for the plan and context combined, using notions from interval arithmetic 17]. Assume that P and C are strongly compatible plans, and that C = ? C ; + C ] and P C = ? P C ; + P C ] are cost estimates for the plans C and P C respectively. We know from the de nition of a cost estimate that ? C + C and ? P C + P C , but the de nition tells us nothing about the relations among the intervals C and P C themselves. Nevertheless, we can conclude that ? C ? P C , since the least expensive execution of the compound plan P C cannot be less costly than the least expensive execution of C, one of its components; and similarly, we can conclude that + C + P C , since the most expensive execution of P C cannot be less costly than the most expensive execution of C. We characterize the pair of estimates C and P C as jointly coherent just in case these two conditions hold: ? C ? P C and + C + P C . As long as C and P C are jointly coherent we can derive a cost estimate P=C = ? P=C ; + P=C ] for the plan P in the context C by de ning ? P=C and + P=C |the minimum and maximum possible costs that might be incurred in executing the compound plan P C in place of C alone|in the following way. Given joint coherence, the end points of the intervals C and P C can stand in only two possible ordering relations:
(1) ? C + C ? P C + P C ; (2) ? C ? P C + C + P C : Case (1) is illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure 5 , and Case (2) on the right-hand side.
In either case, it is clear that + P=C should be de ned as + P C ? ? C , the maximum possible distance between points in P C and C ; this is shown by the solid lines in the gure. In case (1), we know that ? P=C should likewise de ned as ? P C ? + C , the minimum possible distance.
In case (2), it is reasonable to take ? P=C as 0, since we know, even when the low estimate for executing P C is less than the high estimate for executing C, that the true cost of executing P C can be no less than the true cost of executing C. It follows immediately from this de nition that (P=C), the true cost of P in the context C, lies within the derived interval P=C ; and it is also easy to see that the derived interval P=C narrows monotonically as the intervals C and P C are narrowed.
The derived interval estimate of cost in context is useful because, in many cases, it allows an agent to accept or reject an option without calculating its true cost, as illustrated in new option P with bene t (P); and imagine that the agent has assigned estimated costs C and P C to the plans C and P C, from which it derives the estimate P=C = ? P=C ; + P=C ] for the cost of P in the context C. Then if (P) > + P=C , the agent is justi ed in adopting the new option, since the cost in context of the option is necessarily less than its bene t; and likewise, the agent is justi ed in rejecting the option if (P) < ? P=C , since its cost in context is necessarily greater than its bene t. If ? P=C (P) + P=C , there are two subcases to consider. First, if it happens that ? P=C = + P=C , then, since we know that (P=C) lies within the interval P=C , it follows that (P) = (P=C), and so the agent is justi ed either in accepting or rejecting the option. If ? P=C < + P=C , on the other hand, the agent's interval estimates do not provide enough information to determine whether the option should be adopted or rejected. In this last case, and only this case, the agent is forced to re ne its estimates further before making a rational decision, narrowing its cost estimates for C and P C, and thereby also narrowing its derived estimate for P in the context of C.
Reasoning procedures
We now present some algorithms for the reasoning processes described above. As explained earlier, the rst step of the process involves determining whether P is, in fact, strongly compatible with the context C. In work reported elsewhere 26], we have recently developed a new algorithm to compute consistency for plans that have quantitative temporal constraints and steps with extended duration, as well as observation actions and conditional branches. The algorithm uses a CSP-based approach to nd alternative sets of constraints that guarantee consistency of the input plans.
In the present paper, we focus on the reasoning that occurs after a set of conditions for ensuring compatibility has been computed. That is, we develop algorithms by which an agent can compute a cost estimate for the plan P in the context C. An algorithm for this purpose was developed in 29], using a dynamic programming approach to nd an optimally merged plan, one with minimal cost. This cost is precisely (P C), which could then be combined with an exact value for (C) to yield an exact value for (P=C). The option P could then be accepted or rejected depending on the relation between (P=C) and (P).
We do not rely on the algorithm developed in 29], however, for two reasons. First, it applies only to classical plans, which lack metric temporal constraints. And second, it is not in general necessary to compute the exact value of (P=C) in order to evaluate the new option; instead, as suggested earlier, an agent may be able to accept or reject a new option simply on the basis of an interval estimate of its cost in context. The remainder of this section develops an algorithm to implement this idea: evaluating a new option by estimating its cost in context, and then progressively re ning the estimate where necessary. Such an approach may prove to be e cient if, as we suspect, it can frequently terminate in realistic cases without the need to compute an exact cost in context. In addition, the algorithm presented here displays anytime performance, producing cost estimates of monotonically increasing accuracy. Thus, if the agent \runs out of time" in evaluating an option, and is forced to a decision before shrinking the cost range su ciently, the agent can at least make an informed decision; it can determine, for example, how much it stands to lose. Finally, by reasoning about partially scheduled plans and estimated costs, the algorithm matches our intuitions about deliberation in dynamic environments.
Stepsets
Given our current restriction to complete plans, the only factor in uencing plan cost is step merging. To support reasoning about possible step merges, we therefore introduce a data structure called a stepset, which represents possible ways of merging steps in a plan (or in the union of two plans). A stepset clusters (some) steps in a plan that share the same time of execution: where P = hS; O; Li is a consistent plan, a stepset for the plan P is a partition M = f S 1 ]; : : :; S n ]g of S subject to the restriction that Type(S i ) = Type(S j ) for any steps S i and S j belonging to the same equivalence class S k ] in M. Intuitively, a stepset for a plan P represents the set of schedules for P that merge all and only plan steps in the same stepset equivalence class.
Because type-equivalence is a necessary but not su cient condition for placing two steps in the same equivalence class, a given plan may have several di erent stepsets. Consider an extremely simple plan P containing only two steps, S 1 and S 2 , both of which are of the same type. The plan P will have one stepset in which its two steps are clustered, and another in which they are not:
Intuitively, the former corresponds to all schedules for P in which its two steps are merged, while the latter corresponds to those in which they are not. Note that the temporal constraints in P may prevent the merging of its two steps.
More precisely, let be P = hS; O; Li be a plan and let M = f S 1 ]; : : :; S n ]g be a stepset based on P. We de ne the stepset constraints associated with M to be the constraint set containing t i = t j whenever S i ] = S j ], and t i 6 = t j whenever S i ] 6 = S j ], and we will write Const(M) to denote the stepset constraints for stepset M. A stepset M is then de ned as feasible just in case the plan hS; O Const(M); Li is complete and schedulable, and infeasible otherwise.
Stepsets represent only decisions about which steps in a plan are to be merged, neglecting any other information about the order of steps or the exact times of their performance. On the other hand, stepsets do capture all the information that is necessary for computing plan cost, because, under the current assumptions, cost depends only on step merging. Given a stepset M for a plan P, we can introduce a notion of stepset cost determined by M|written SSCost(M)|as follows:
The stepset cost determined by M then coincides with the cost of any scheduled re nement of the plan P whose schedule is consistent with Const(M).
The stepsets based on a plan P can be organized into a lattice, as follows. The top element of the lattice is the minimally merged stepset Minmerge(P), de ned as the partition f S 1 ]; : : :; S n ]g in which each equivalence class S i ] is identi ed with the unit set fS i g. The bottom element of the lattice is the maximally merged stepset Maxmerge(P), de ned as the partition f S 1 ]; : : :; S n ]g, in which each equivalence class S i ] is identi ed with the set fS j : Type(S j ) = Type(S i )g containing all steps sharing the type of S i . Clearly, the minimally merged stepset has maximal cost, and the maximally merged stepset has minimal cost. 
The algorithm
We now present our algorithm, depicted in Figure 7 , for evaluating an option P in the context C, under the assumption that the two plans are strongly compatible. The algorithm works with two stepset lattices, based on the plans C and P C. or infeasibility of the nodes in the frontiers, re ning the cost estimates for the plans C and P C, and using them to update the derived cost estimate for P in the context C. After each re nement, the derived estimate of cost in context is compared with (P), the bene t of P. If (P) is outside the range of the current estimate, the algorithm then terminates with a recommendation to either accept or reject P.
We have left the decision about which estimate to re ne ( C or P C ) nondeterministic in the algorithm, thereby decoupling the control heuristics from the algorithm itself. A similar decoupling has proven to be useful in the analysis of many AI algorithms. This tactic has two advantages. First, it simpli es the base algorithm; see 27] for an example of this applied to classical plan generation. Second, it allows for separate, focused investigation of heuristics for e cient control, something we are now exploring in our ongoing work. For example, recent work in decision-theoretic plan generation 8] has analyzed the use of interval-based utility estimates in nding optimal plans, and there is potential for the transfer of this analysis to our framework. See also our discussion in Section 4.
The procedure Refine(Q)|where Q ranges over C and P C|is itself straightforward, simply calling either Refine-Down(Q) or Refine-Up(Q), again, nondeterministically choosing between them.
The two re nement procedures are similar, and we rst describe Refine-Down(Q), shown in Figure 8 . Essentially, what it does is select a node M from the upper frontier of Q, and check its feasibility. The nodes are selected in decreasing order of cost. Thus, if M is found to be feasible, its cost is less than that of any previously examined feasible node; hence the current upper bound on the cost estimate, + Q , can be set to the cost of M. What if M is found to be infeasible? Both C and P C are consistent; the latter is a consequence of the strong compatibility of P and C. Thus, regardless of whether Q is C or P C, its stepset lattice is guaranteed to contain at least one feasible node. If a feasible node has not yet been found|that is, if Actual + Q = F|we know that some feasible element exists whose stepset cost is less than that of M, and so + Q can be set to re ect the highest stepset cost of the remaining elements. Again, this can only lower the value of + Q . However, if a feasible point has already been found, we have no guarantee of nding another, and so determining that M is infeasible does not lead to updating the value of + Q .
After examining M, the procedure removes it from the upper frontier, and replaces it with its down-successors, so that they can be considered in subsequent iterations.
The procedure Refine-Up(Q), presented in Figure 9 , is nearly a dual to Refine from the lower frontier. It di ers, however, in its behavior when a feasible node is found.
The reason for this is that the rst feasible node found represents (Q), the true cost of Q:
because the procedure selects nodes in increasing order of cost, the rst feasible node it nds necessarily corresponds to the least expensive schedule for Q, which is the true cost of Q.
Therefore, immediately upon nding a feasible node, Refine-Up(Q) sets the upper bound + Q to ? Q , narrowing the estimate to a point.
One nal comment about the algorithms concerns the initial lines of both Refine-Up(Q) and Refine-Down(Q), which require that Actual ? Q = F. This is simply a bookkeeping condition: because Refine-Up(Q) sets both ? Q and + Q to the exact cost of Q at the same time as it sets Actual ? Q = T, this condition blocks additional calls to either procedure from producing any further e ect. 
Implementation and Analysis
We implemented our algorithms in Allegro Common Lisp. The amount of time required for each iteration is dominated by the step that checks whether a stepset is feasible; the remaining tasks|generating successor stepsets, computing stepset costs, and comparing the cost estimate to the plan bene t|are all quite fast. To perform feasibility checking, we used an algorithm we developed to compute compatibility of plans with conditional branches and rich temporal constraints, as mentioned above 20]. The performance of our feasibility-checking algorithm depends signi cantly on a number of factors, including the size of the plans, the number of branches they contain, the amount of potential con ict between them, and the tightness of their temporal constraints. Because the algorithm relies on CSP techniques, its worst-case performance is NP-complete, but there are well-known methods for achieving in-practice acceptable behavior, and we are currently developing others 25].
Here we note simply that we have so far used only brute-force constraint propagation techniques in compatibility checking, and are currently investigating techniques for signicantly more e cient processing.
The performance of our overall algorithm is clearly a function of the number of nodes in the stepset lattice that must be generated and processed by the Evaluate-Option routine.
We can compute the size of the largest possible stepset lattice for a given plan as follows.
First, note that the number of ways to partition m objects into n buckets leaving no bucket Suppose that the plan P includes z distinct types of actions, represented as T 1 ; T 2 ; : : :; T z ; and de ne num(P; T i ) to be the number of actions from P belonging to the type of T i . Clearly, the number of ways of partitioning the actions in P of type T i is N num(P; T i )].
The partitions of the di erent actions types are independent, and so the overall size of the stepset lattice for the plan P is simply
the product of the numbers of partitions for each of the various action types in the plan. In the worst case, then, the size of the stepset lattice for a plan is exponential in the size of the plan, and so the time required by Evaluate-Option to search through the entire stepset lattices generated by C and P C is likewise exponential. However, there are several reasons to believe that worst case performance will rarely occur. First, we suspect that in realistic cases|plans like those confronted by real agents in the real world|it will seldom be necessary to search through the entire stepset lattices in order to determine whether a new option should be accepted or rejected. More often, the system should determine fairly quickly that the value of the plan, P], lies outside the cost range ? P=C ; + P=C ].
Second, the algorithm as described searches through the stepset lattices blindly, but a number of promising heuristics suggest themselves. For example, if the value of the new option v P] is very close to + P=C |much closer than to ? P=C |then it is natural to attempt to reduce + P=C , hoping to push this value lower than v P], so that the reasoning can terminate with a decision to accept the new option. Because + P=C is de ned as + P C ? ? C , this suggests calling either Refine-Down(P C) with the hope of lowering the value of + P C or calling Refine-Up(C) with the hope of raising the cost of ? C . A dual argument applies when v P] is very close to ?
P=C . Speci cally, it is natural to raise the value of ? P=C with the hope of pushing this value above that of v P], guaranteeing a quick decision to reject. Since ? P=C is de ned as max 0; ? P C ? + C ], this suggests attempting either to raise ? P C through a call to RefineUp(P C) or attempting to lower + C through a call to Refine-Down(C). Heuristics such as these cannot be accurately tested on generic cases, but must be explored in the context of speci c realistic domains.
Finally, the worst case, in which the size of the stepset lattice is exponential in the number of steps, occurs only with highly arti cial plans, in which virtually all of the plan steps share a very small number of types. The size of the associated stepset lattices rapidly diminishes as plan steps become more evenly distributed among types; in the limiting case in which each action in the plan has a unique type, the stepset lattice contains only a single point. We illustrate this point in Figure 10 , showing the number of nodes in the stepset lattice for plans of various lengths, under the assumption that the plan steps are divided evenly into one, two, and four distinct types. Note that the y-axis of this graph is logarithmic|necessary because of the very rapid growth when all steps have the same type|so that, although the 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed the foundations of a theory of rational choice that takes seriously the view that agents make decisions in the context of their existing plans. The overall picture we have is one in which an agent maintains a set of commitments, some of which, at any given time, will be only partially speci ed. A new option for action must then be evaluated taking into account interactions between that option and the background context. Recognizing that agents have computational resource limits, we have developed an account that does not require the agent always to compute the exact cost of an option in context; instead, we have shown how estimates of option cost can support rational choice.
The work done to date provides an initial development of the theory. Both formal and computational extensions are required to increase its robustness. As an instance of the former, consider our current use of particular executions as points in the semantic space.
It seems reasonable to generalize that approach and interpret a plan as specifying a set of allowed futures|intuitively, those futures consistent with an execution of the plan. An interpretation along these lines might be developed within the general logical framework of branching time 21, 24] . With regard to computational issues, it seems clear that signi cant work remains to develop heuristics to improve the e ciency of our algorithms.
In addition, we have so far provided details only for a very restricted case of the general problem, and it is clear that the theory must be extended along a number of dimensions.
Some such extensions are relatively straightforward. For example, we have discussed only cost savings that result from merging of type-identical steps, but sometimes it is also possible to merge steps of di erent types that both achieve the particular conditions required in the current context. Also, we have discussed only plans that involve a single, albeit possibly merged, action at a time, but have not here considered plans with true concurrency: two or more steps of di erent types performed at the same moment. To achieve such concurrency, we could make use of mutex relations as in the GraphPlan literature 2].
Other generalizations will require more signi cant extensions to the theory as we have developed it in the paper. Most notably, we have dealt here only with complete, primitive plans, all of whose actions are instantaneous. In related work, we have been directly concerned with plans that include rich temporal constraints such as deadlines and durations 26], and we believe that the techniques developed there can be adapted to the problem of step merging in a more realistic temporal framework. Handling incomplete plans, however, requires extending the algorithms for cost computation, because the cost of an incomplete plan depends not just on possible ways of scheduling it, but also on possible ways of completing it. Similarly, handling hierarchical plans requires reasoning about possible decompositions.
In both of these cases, methods for plan generation must be interwoven with the cost computation process.
Finally, we have focused our attention in this paper on new options that are at least strongly compatible with the background context. Although this is a reasonable starting point, it is clearly important to generalize the theory so it can handle other situations. We 
